RECENT CASE NOTES by unknown
RECENT CASE NOTES
AGENCY-ToRTS-RE PONSiBILITY OF HUSBAND FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY WIFE
DRIVING FAMILy AuTo omLE.-The defendant maintained an automobile for the
use of himself and his family. His wife while driving alone and for her own
pleasu;re negligently injured the plaintiff. The defendant assigned as error the
trial court's ruling that the relationship of principal and agent was sufficiently
established. Held, that there was no error, for the defendant by keeping an
automobile for the pleasure of his family made this use of it his business. Stick-
ney v. Epstein (1923, Conn.) 123 Atl. I.
The courts have rejected the dangerous instrumentality rule as a possible
ground for imposing responsibility on the owner of a family automobile. Jones
v. Hoge (i9o7) 47 Wash. 663, 92 Pac. 433. See (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
785; NOTES (1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. 91; contra: Southern Cotton Oil Co. v.
Anderson (192o) 8o Fla. 441, 86 So. 629. The majority of courts apply the doc-
trine of respondeat superior and hold the father responsible'when the son or wife
occupies the position of chauffeur for another member of the family. Stowe v.
Morris (1912) 147 Ky. 386, I44 S. W. 52; Graham v. Page (I921) 300 Ill. 40,
132 N. E. 817. Or when the son or wife is alone and therefore filling the dual
role of chauffeur and passenger. Miller v. Weck (192o) 186 Ky. 552, 217 S. W.
9o4; contra: Arkin v. Page (1919) 287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E. 30. But this view
requires an extension of the concept of a father's "business" to include his
family's pleasure in the use of his automobile; it has therefore been criticized
as straining the principles of agency and as an encroachment on the general rule
that a father is not responsible for the torts of his wife and children. Van
Blaricom v. Dodgson (1917) 220 N. Y. III, I5 N. E. 443; Hays v. Hogan
(1917) 273 Mo. I, 200 S. W. 286. However, these doctrines themselves were
shaped without reference to this new set of facts, and to be applied thereto
must be themselves extended. Cf. Lumley v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 El. & BI. 216.
See Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Collected Legal Papers (1920) 167, i81;
and "Law in Science and Science in Law," ibid. 210, 239. In determining under
which rule to bring the new situation, the social result should be consciously
considered. Pound, "Courts and Legislation," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series(1917) 202; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 65. If the
paterfamilias is held liable, insurance by heads of families against such risks
may be expected to follow, and that group of the community, the owners, who
are chiefly benefited by the existence of the automobile, will bear the loss. If
he is not made responsible, a judgment against one of his dependents will generally
be valueless, and the loss will remain on the injured person. The instant case
therefore adapts the doctrine of respondeat superior to what is apparently the
sounder social policy and by so doing follows the spirit of the historical develop-
ment of that doctrine. See Holmes, "Agency," op. cit. 49; Wigmore, "Respon-
sibility for Tortious Acts," 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History
(1909) 474. For presentations of the conflicting views, see (1920) 29 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 467; Huddy, Automobiles (6th ed. 1922) secs. 66o-662.
BANKS AND BANKING-DEpoSITs FOR A SPECIFIC PURPOSE--OVERPAYMENT-
MITIGATION OF DAMAGEs.-The plaintiff, a purchaser of grapes, deposited with
the defendant bank a check for $3oooo, the bank to pay stated amounts to
designated sellers on receipt of bills of lading. The defendant received a bill
of lading for grapes in excess of the quantity purchased and paid more than the
amount set. The plaintiff refused to take the excess and sued the bank for
the amount paid therefor. Held, that the plaintiff should have mitigated damages
by receiving and reselling the grapes, and that he could recover merely the loss,
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if any, caused by the bank's act. Kornblum v. Bank of Italy (1923, Calif. App.)
2 Pac. 143.
A specific deposit must be used only for the designated purposes. Dolph v.
Cross (1911) 153 Iowa, 289, 133 N. W. 669; Union Trust & Savings Bank v.
Southern Traction Co. (1922, C. C. A. 7th) 283 Fed. 5o. Thus, it may not be
used in payment of an existing debt of the depositor arising out of other transac-
tions. Southern Exch. Bank v. Pope (i2i, Ga.) io8 S. E. 551. And the docu-
ments against which payment is made must correspond in all respects with the
terms of the letter of credit established, to be a valid charge against it. Brazilian
& Portuguese Bank v. British & American Exchange Banking Corp. (1868,
Exch.) 18 L. T. R. 823; Ward, American Commercial Credits (1922) 257;
COMMENTS (1924) 33 YALE LAW JouRNAL., 651. If then a bank pays against
unauthorized documents, the so-called "duty" to mitigate damages must logically
be placed upon it. See Imbrie v. Nagae & Co. (1921, 2d Dept.) 196 App. Div.
38o, 187 N. Y. Supp. 692. And there seem to be no sound reason for applying
a different rule where a bank overpays under an established credit, whether or
not the credit be evidenced by letter. A buyer is privileged, as against his seller,
to reject goods in excess of the amount contracted for. Iron Cliffs. Co. v. Buld
(1879) 42 Mich. 86, 3 N. W. 269; Uniform Sales Act, sec. 44 (2).. He owes his
seller no "duty" to receive the goods and mitigate damages; so to hold would
make him liable in an action for refusal to accept Rock v. Vandine (1920) io6
Kan. 588, 189 Pac. 157; COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 380. But the
result in the instant case may be sustained on the facts. None of the purchases
corresponded exactly with the figures designated in the instructions, and there
was evidence that the plaintiff did not require the payment of the exact sum
authorized for each seller named.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SEPARATION OF POWERs-NATIONAL Bixs-PowER OF
STATE TO PROHIBIT BRANcH BANKs.-A Missouri statute prohibited the establish-
ment of branch banks. Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919, sec. 11737. A proceeding in the
nature of quo warranto was brought by the state to determine by what authority,
under this statute, the national bank could establish and conduct a branch bank.
Upon the ovdrruling of a demurrer to the information, the case was appealed.
Held, (three judges dissenting) that the statute validly applied to national banks
and that the judgment be affirmed. First National Bank of St. Louis v. Missouri
(1924, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. 213.
Since a national bank acts under federal authority, no state legislation can
incapacitate it or frustrate its purpose. First National Bank v. California
(1923) 262 U. S. 366, 43 Sup. Ct. 6o2. And where Congress has acted it takes
precedence over state legislation. Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank (1896) 161
U. S. 275, 16 Sup. Ct 5o2; In re Turner's Estate (1923) 277 Pa. iO, 120 At].
70r. But national banks have never been expressly empowered to establish
branch banks. (1911) 29 Opinions of the Atty. Gen. 81. When a bank acts
beyond the powers granted by Congress, it subjects itself to that extent to
state regulation. First National Bank v. Commonwealth (i9iI) 143 Ky. 816,
137 S. W. 518. Similarly Congress has the power to pass a uniform bank-
ruptcy act, but the states still retain the power to legislate provided no
conflict with the national act results. Mayer v. Hellan. (1875) 91 U. S. 497;
Old Town Bank of Baltimore v. McCormick (19o3) 96 Md. 341, 53 At. 934.
And when the nature of the case does not demand uniformity, the states
may legislate as to interstate commerce in the absence of congressional action.
Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. (1829, U. S.) 2 Pet. 245; License Cases
(1847, U. S.) 5 How. 504; Cooke, The Pseudo-Doctrine of the Exclusiveness
of the Power of Congress to Regulate Interstate Commerce (19ii) 20 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 2g7. Or even as to national defense. Gilbert v. Minnesota
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(1920) 254 U. S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct 125; (I92I) ig MicH. L. REV. 87o. But
these are all cases of powers expressly granted by our constitution. A fortiori
should the states retain some control. where the power, as here to establish
national banks, is merely implied. See McCulloch v. Maryland (18ig, U. S.)
4 Wheat 316. This is particularly so since Congress remains free to lay down
a uniform rule which would place the matter beyond state control. Cf. Farmers'
National Bank v .Deering (1875) 9, U. S. 29. Until Congress so acts the law
as declared in the instant case is sound.
CoNTRAcrs-OPnioNs-FIsT PRIVILEGE TO PURCHAsE.-The defendant leased
certain premises to the plaintiff with the stipulation: "First privilege is extended
to the said party of the second part to purchase said property at any time during
the lease term at a price of $5,500." The plaintiff tendered performance, and the
defendant refused to convey on the ground that the clause did not give the plaintiff
an absolute option to purchase, but only the first chance should the lessor decide to
sell. The lessee sued for specific performance. Held, that the decree be for the
plaintiff. Tantum v. Keller (1924, N. J. Ch.) 123 At. 299.
The language of the covenant is ambiguous, but it might have been construed as
contemplating only an option conditional on the lessor's election to sell at all.
Schroeder v. Gemeinder (1875) IO Nev. 355; see Buckmaster v. Thompson (1867)
36 N. Y. 558; Wells v. Fisher (1923) 237 N. Y. 79, 142 N. E. 358; cf. Reed v.
Cambell (x886, CIL) 43 N. J. Eq. 4o6, 4 Atl. 433 (first privilege to renew lease) ;
Hill v. Prior (1919) 79 N. H. 188, io6 Atl. 641; Cloverdale Co. v. Littlefield
(1921) 24o Mass. 129, 133 N. E. 565; contra: Kastens v. Ruland (1923, N. J.)
12o Atl. 21 (words construed as absolute option). That the price was made
definite is not, as the court seems to think, conclusive against this interpretation.
McCormick v. Stephany (igoo, Ch.) 61 N. J. Eq. 208, 48 Atl. 25; Burleigh v.
Mactier (i919, N. J. Ch.) io8 At. 84. An enforceable option must state all the
terms of the contract in order to satisfy the statute of frauds. Couch v. McCoy
(1905, S. D. W. Va.) 138 Fed. 696; Monahan v. Allen (1913) 47 Mont. 75, 130
Pac. 768. But the price may be left to be determined by a bona fide offer of any
third party. Harper v. Runner (19o9) 85 Neb. 343, 123 N. W. 313; Cummings v.
Nielson (1913) 42 Utah, 157, 129 Pac. 61g; Adams v. Helburn (1923, Ky.) 249
S. W. 543; see Jones v. Moncrief-Cook Co. (19o8) 25 Okla. 856, io8 Pac. 403;
Fry, Specific Performance (6th ed. 1921) 65. Again, the price may be left to
be fixed by appraisers. Lester Agricultural Chemical Works v. Selby (19o4, Ch.)
68 N. J. Eq. 271, 59 Atl. 247; Martin v. Van Sant (1917) 99 Wash. io6, 168
Pac. 990. An agreement to give the lessee the first privilege to purchase in case
the lessor decides to sell is enforceable even against a purchaser from the lessor
with notice. Hayes v. O'Brien (1894) 149 Ill. 403, 37 N. E. 73; Slaughter v.
Mallet Land & Cattle Co. (9o5, C. C. A. 5th) 141 Fed. 282; Jurgenson V.
Morris (i92o, 2d Dept.) 194 App. Div. 92, 185 N. Y. Supp. 386. But not where
the terms are so indefinite that the "option" is a mere agreement to make an
agreement. Fogg v. Price (1888) 145 Mass. 513, 14 N. E. 741; (1923) 33 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 97.
EVIDENcE-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-WAvER OF PaiviLEE.-The plaintiff, in a
suit to recover the value of a car of corn, testified in his own behalf concerning
certain communications made to his attorney. The attorney was later called
as a witness and was questioned as to the subject matter of these communications.
To this the plaintiff objected. Under Ohio Gen. Code, igio, sec. 11494 a witness
who testifies on any subject waives his privilege as to that subject. The lower
court sustained the objection. Held, that by "subject" was meant the subject of
the controversy and that it was the intention of the legislature to include the
subject matter of his testimony generally, and that the privilege was waived.
Spitzer v. Stillings (1924, Ohio), i42N. E. 365.
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The privilege existing between attorney and client was originally regarded as
that of the attorney. Anon. (1693, K. B.) Skinner, 404. Its aim was to protect
the honor of the attorney. See Jones v. Countess of Manchester (1673, K. B.)
i Ventr. I97. In the first half of the eighteenth century the modern theory
that the privilege was that of the client grew up beside the older one. 5 Wig-
more, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 29o; Wilson v. R=tall (1792, K. B.) 4 T. R.
753. Early in the nineteenth century the privilege became that of the client alone.
Wright v. Mayer (18oi, Ch.) 6 Ves.'Jr. 281. The change was made to promote
a freedom of consultation by removing apprehension of disclosure by legal
advisers. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2291. This privilege, however,
may be waived. Hunt v. Blackburn (1888) 128 U. S. 464, 9 Sup. Ct. 125. Some
courts hold that there is no waiver unless a specific reference to the communica-
tions is made. Tate v. Tate (188) 75 Va. 522; Fearnley v. Fearnley (i9o8)
44 Colo. 417, 98 Pac. 8ig (statute). But such a specific reference on cross
examination is not a waiver. Air Line Ry. v. Parker (I913) 65 Fla. 543, 62 So.
589. Others hold that testimony as to an interview with an attorney is a waiver
as to all that occurred at that interview. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Hill (i8g6)
II5 Ala. 334, 22 So. 163. A broader view is that there is a waiver of all matters
relating to the "same subject" testified to by the client. Oliver v. Pate (1873)
43 Ind. 132. Under such a view it has been held that a reference to communica-
tions with the attorney is not necessary. In re Young's Estate (1911) 59 Or.
348, 116 Pac. 95. In the instant case the decision is based upon a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory phrase "on the same subject."
EviDENCE-CoNFESsIoNs-ADmISSIoN5S-TRUSTWORTHINESS WHEN INDUCED BY
PRoMIsES oR THREATs.-To a police court complaint charging adultery the defen-
dant pleaded guilty. He was later indicted for incest for the same act. At the
incest trial, the plea of guilty to the adultery charge was introduced in evidence.
It was objected to on the ground that it was a "confession" made as a result of
"inducements and offers" and a preliminary hearing demanded. Held, that the
plea of guilty was an "admission," and that there was no error in denying a pre-
liminary hearing. Commonwealth v. Haywood (1923, Mass.) 141 N. E. 571.
A defendant's statements bearing on his guilt are, under the sounder theory,
excluded in criminal proceedings when induced by promises or threats, if they
contain acknowledgments of such operative facts of guilt that they are con-
sidered apt to be untrustworthy. People v. Heide (1922) 3o2 Ill. 624, 135 N. E.
77; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) secs. 822, 866; (1921) 30 YALE LAw
JOURNAI, 418. Experience has indicated that the more operative facts are admitted,
the more likely are the statements to be false when induced by promises or
threats. Such untrustworthiness should also warrant their exclusion in civil
proceedings. Tilley v. Damon (1853, Mass.) ii Cush. 247; Scott v. Home
Insurance Co. (187o, C. C. D. Mo.) Fed. Cas. No. 12,533; contra: see Fidler v.
McKinley (1859) 21 Ill. 308; 2 Wigmore, op. cit. sec. 815, note i. In criminal
proceedings the danger that the prejudicial effect of such statements is not
destroyed by striking out has further induced most courts to allow a preliminary
hearing where promises or threats are alleged. State v. Storms (1901) 113
Iowa, 385, 85 N. W. 618; 18 L. R. A. (x. s.) 777, note. Where the facts are
merely evidential, the statements are admitted even if induced by promises or
threats. The theory in such a case must be that the statements are sufficiently
untrustworthy. People v. Anmerman (1897) ix8 Calif. 23, 50 Pac. Is. It has
not been commonly noted that a "confession" rarely embraces all the operative
facts essential to a conviction. Statements within this class shade off impercepti-
bly into "admissions," that is acknowledgments of insufficient operative facts or
of evidentiary facts of guilt. Cf. State v. Guil (1919) 56 Mont. 485, 186 Pac. 329.
The court in the principal case considered the former plea of guilty as an
"admission" rather than a "confession" as it did not contain an acknowledgment
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of the relationship of the parties. But it was in itself a complete acknowledg-
ment of a crime, and of an essential part of the crime charged. As such it
seems more in harmony with the policy of the classification to consider the
defendant's plea a "confession."
EXTRADITION-FUGITIVES FROM JUSTIcE-NECESSITY FOR PHYSICAL PRESENCE AT
TIME OF COMMISSION OF CrME.-The relator was indicted in Ohio for failure to
support his minor children. He was a resident of New York, but had made
several short visits to Ohio during the period covered by the indictment. A
requisition from the Governor of Ohio for his arrest was honored by the
Governor of New York, and an executive warrant issued. The relator sued out
a writ of habeas .corpus. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the writ be sus-
tained, since.the relator was not a fugitive from justice. People, ex reL Gotts--.
chalk, v. Brown. (1923, 4th D.ept.) 207 App. Div. 695, 2Ol N. Y. Supp. 862.
A person who commits a crime against a state while outside of its territory
may be punished by the state on a subsequent acquisition of personal jurisdiction.
State v. Wolkow (1922) 1no Kan. 722, 205 Pac. 639; 19 L. R. A. 775, note;
33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 331; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 457, 462. The same principle has been
applied to the crime of non-support. In re Fowles (1913) 89 Kan.'430, 131 Pac.
598; State v. Sanner (191o) 81 Ohio St. 393, 90 N. E. ioo7; contra: Ex parte
Kuhns (1913) 36 Nev. 487, 137 Pac. 83. The power to extradite, however, is
limited by constitutional provision and congressional statutes to persons who
are fugitives from justice. See U. S. Const. Art. 4, sec. 2; U. S. Rev. Sts. 1874,
sec. 5278. The term "fugitive from justice" is generally confined to persons
within the demanding state at the time the crime was committed. Hyatt v.
Corkran (19o3) 188 U. S. 691, 23 Sup. Ct. 456; COMMENTS (I915) 3 CAuIF. L.
REv. 236; NOTES (igi8) 18 COL. L. REV. 70; Ann. Cas. 1918 D, io11, note.
Extra-territorial crimes, which are the most dependent upon extradition for
their enforcement, are thus without the pale of our extradition procedure. Due
perhaps to the increasing recognition of such crimes, recent cases have adopted
a more liberal interpretation of the term "fugitive from justice." The accused
need not do within the demanding state all the acts necessary to accomplish the
crime; any overt material act there is sufficient. Strssheim v. Daily (1911)
221 U. S. 280, 31 Sup. Ct. 558; Finch v. West (1921) io6 Neb. 45, 182 N. W. 565.
In crimes which may be consummated without any overt act, it is sufficient that
the accused visited the state during the period covered by the indictment. Hogan
v. O'Neill (1921) 255 U. S. 52, 41 Sup. Ct. 222 (conspiracy). Or that he passed
through in a train. Ex parte Montgomery (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 244 Fed. 967.
Similarly in the case of a county a visit of a few days has been held to give
jurisdiction of the crime of failure to support. State vt. Ford (1922) 151 Minn.
382, I86 N. W. 812. The cases tend to regard the-requirement of physical pres-
ence as a mere technicality, and to construe the extradition statute in favor of
a more expeditious enforcement of the criminal laws of the states. This might
well have been done in the instant case.
[While this issue of the JOURNAL was in press the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the Appellate Division. Three judges dissented. See the April
i8, 1924 number of the NEw YoarK LAW JOURNAL.-ED.]
LABOR LAw-TRADE UNIONS-MEMBERSHIP-REMEDIES FOR WRONGFUL ExPUL-
sioN.-The plaintiff member sued the defendant trade union for wrongful and
malicious expulsion. The defense was that the plaintiff had not exhausted the
remedy within the association. From a judgment of the lower court overruling
the defense the defendant appealed. Held, that the court's ruling be affirmed.
Grand International Brotherhood of Locomoive Engineers v. Green (1923, Ala.)
g8 So. 569.
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Voluntary associations may impose any qualifications for membership. Mayer
v. The Journw3me Stonecutters' Assoc. (1890) 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492.
A member may withdraw at any time without the consent of the association in
the absence of a contrary agreement between the members. Somo v. Indpendent
Order of Foresters (1917) 83 Or. 654, 164 Pac. 187. It is often said that courts
have no jurisdiction to give relief against expulsion except where property
rights are involved. Rigby v. Connol (i88o) L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 482. But courts
take jurisdiction when the decision within the organization is illegal or contrary
to the rules of the association itself. Schneider v. Local Union No. 6o (19o5)
I16 La. 27o, 40 So. 700 (member fined and suspended for refusal to appoint man
recommended by the union to public office) ; Gardner v. East Rock Lodge (1921)
96 Conn. 198, 113 Atl. 308. Similarly when the action is not bona fide or is
contrary to "natural justice." Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective and
Benevolent Union (1888) 75 Calif. 308, 17 Pac. 217; Burn v. National Amal-
gamated Labourers' Union [192o] 2 Ch. 364; see (192o) 3o YALE LAW JOURNAL,
2o2. But not on questions of the internal government ,of the association. Stivers
v. Blethen (1923) 124 Wash. 473, 215 Pac. 7 (local union ordered by executive
council to reimburse employer for money paid out to member as wages pending
appeal). And it is usually stated that a member must exhaust his remedies
within the association before seeking relief in court. Pixley v. Cleaver (1920)
1O5 Neb. 485, 181 N. W. 138. For the limitations of this doctrine see (1922)
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 328. The holding of the principal case, that the rule
applies only when the member is seeking reinstatement and not when he is suing
for damages, is supported by the cases. Bonham v. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen (192o) 146 Ark. 117,225 S. W. 335; Thompson v. Grand International
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (195o) 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S. W.
834. This seems reasonable so far as the remedy within would be inadequate in
a suit for damages. An association would hardly award damages against itself
for expelling a member; and to require him to exhaust the remedy within
would only extend the proceedings. But whether the member should have a
right to damages if the union is willing to reinstate him is questionable. In
joining the union -a member would seem to agree to 'bear any injury due to
mistakes of lower tribunals of the union until passed upon by its highest tribunal.
MORTGAGES-DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDs-ORAL AGREEMENT TO EXECUTE A MORT-
GAGE.-The defendant's intestate, indebted to the plaintiff for $1,2oo, orally
agreed in consideration of a further advance of $IOO, to execute a mortgage on
certain land for the entire indebtedness. The plaintiff advanced this sum and
received the deeds to the land for the sole purpose of having a legal mortgage
executed. Before this could be done the intestate died. The plaintiff sought
specific performance of the agreement. Held, that the Statute of Frauds wa§ a
bar to the plaintiff's recovery. Sleeth v. Sampson (1923) 237 N. Y. 69, i42
N. E. 355.
In England, an equitable mortgage may be created by a deposit of title deeds.
Bank of New South Wales v. O'Connor [1889, P. C.] 14 A. C. 273, 282. Most
American jurisdictions do not recognize this doctrine because it violates the
Statute of Frauds and the spirit of our registry system. Meador v. Meador
(1871, Tenn.) 3 Heisk, 562; Graines v. Consol. Timber Co. (1914, D. Or.)
215 Fed. 785; contra: Jennings v. Augir (1914, D. Wash.) 215 Fed. 658;
NoTEs (1914) 14 CoL L. REv. 672. New York early adopted the English view,
but it has recently been discredited there. Rockwell v. Hobby (1844, N. Y.)
2 Sandf. Ch. 9; see Ebling Brewing Co. v. Gennaro (1919, 2d Dept.) 189 App.
Div. 782, 785, 179 N. Y. Supp. 384, 387. The court suggested in the instant case
that since the deposit was not given for an immediate security the doctrine was
not applicable. But most English cases consider that a deposit of deeds pend-
ing the preparation of a legal mortgage gives an even stronger case for relief
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to the lender. Ex parte Bruce (1813, Bankruptcy) I Rose, 374; Hockley v.
Bantock (1826, Ch.) I Russ. 141; contra: Norris v. Wilkinson (18o6, Ch.)
12 Ves. 192. Strong dicta in several New York cases have intimated that a
recovery might be allowed on the oral agreement alone. Sprague v. Cochran
(1894) 144 N. Y. 1O4, 112, 38 N. E. IOOO, ioo2; Stoddard v. Hart (i86i.) 23
N. Y. 556, 561; but see Meixel v. Meixel (1914, 1st Dept.) 116 App. Div. 518,
146 N. Y. Supp. 587; see Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in; New York (1920)
20 CoL. L. REV. 519, 522. And a few courts have so held. Foster Lumber Co. v.
County Bank (9o5) 71 Kans. I58, 8o Pad. 49 (payment sufficient part perform-
ance) ; Cole v. Cole (1874) 41 Md. 301 (failure to carry out the agreement
constituting fraud); Irvine v. Armstrong (1883) 31 Minn. 216, 17 N. W. 343
(inequitable not to give relief). But by the majority view an agreement to give
a mortgage is within the Statute of Frauds. Edwards v. Scruggs (i908) 155
Ala. 568, 46 So. 85o; 3 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) sec. 603. And
payment of money alone is not sufficient part performance. Poarch v. Duncan
(i9o6) 41 Tex. Civ. App. 275, 91 S. W. 1110; I Williston, Contracts (i92o)
sec. 491; see Newman v. Newman (Ig2i) io3 Ohio St. 230, 133 N. E. 7o; 18
A. L. R. io98, note. The result in the instant case seems sound. The exception
to the statute made in cases Df part performance shbuld not be extended to
make such a transaction enforceable, as it would enable a simple loan to be
converted into a security transaction. This is particularly true when as in the
instant case a past indebtedness constituted the bulk of the consideration.
PROPERTY-SALvAGE-PoSSEsSION SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN TRESPASS AGAINST
SUBSEQUENT SALvo.-The plaintiffs located and attempted to salvage a wreck
thought to contain gold. They maintained buoys over the wreck, and had suc-
ceeded in raising some of the cargo but no gold was found. The defendants
demanded the privilege of aiding as co-salvors and sent down divers. The plain-
tiffs sought an injunction and damages for the trespass. An interim injunction-was
refused and plaintiffs appealed. Held, that the injunction be granted and the
plaintiffs recover damages for the trespass. Tle Tubantia (1924, P. D. & Ad.)
40 T. L. R- 335.
The operative facts said 'o constitute "possession" seem to be made to vary
according to the result the court desires to reach in any particular case. Thus an
action to recover the possession of a wild animal may be brought by one who has
mortally wounded it so that actual capture is reasonably certain to follow. Liesner
v. Wanie (1914) 156 Wis. 16, 145 N. W. 374. Whereas encouragement of the
development of natural resources has led to the rule that possessory rights in
mineral deposits on public lands are not acquired by mere presence, unless coupled
with discovery or active work toward discovery. Whiting v. Straup (io8) 17
W-Yo. I, 95 Pac. 849. With lost goods, discovery plus some act of control gives
such "possession" as founds trover against a third party. Agnew v. Baker (1917)
204 Ill. App. 56 (ordering abandoned car to be repaired); Weeks v. Hackett
(9o8) 104 Me. 264, 71 Atl. 858. But where the issue was larceny by the finder,
full physical control before the felonious intent was formed was declared mere
custody. Pritchett v. State (1854) 34 Tenn. 285. Where-no conscious physical
control has been even attempted, ownership of a thing on or in which the disputed
chattel is found has sometimes been allowed as an equivalent. Goddard v. Winchell
(1892) 86 Iowa, 71, 52 N. W. 1124; McKee v. Gratz (1922) 26o U. S. 127, 43
Sup. Ct. 16; but see Vickery v. Hardin (1922, Ind.) 133 N. E. 922 (treasure
trove). But intent to exclude the public from the land has been held requisite.
Hoagland v. Amusement Co. (1902) 170 Mo. 335, 70 S. W. 878; Batteiger v. Penn.
Co. (1916) 64 Pa. Super. Ct. 195. Otherwise, however, where it seemed that
return of the lost chattel to the owner was best accomplished by treating the
owner of the locus in quo as the possessor, though there was no intent to exclude
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others. Foulke v. N. Y. Consol. Ry. (192o) "8 N. Y. 269, 127 N. E. 237. A
similar policy leads to the protection of a first attempting salvor. Thus presence
near the wreck satisfies the requirement of actual control except where the salvor
is shown to be manifestly incompetent. The Amethyst (1840) Fed. Cas. No. 330;
see The Eidilo (1917, E. D. N. C.) 246 Fed. 47o. To support a maritime lien
against the owner, valuable salvage service is further required. The Killeena
(188o) L. R 6 P. 193; Merrill v. Fisher (i9IO) 204 Mass. 6oq, 9I N. E. 132;
NOTES (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 453. But as against third parties there need be
only an intent to exercise the control to the exclusion of others. Bads v. Brazleton
(1861) 22 Ark 499 (buoy over wreck not sufficient) ; Holmes, The Common Law
(i881) 216. The instant case is sound.
SALES-SALE OF A GOING CONCERN--DELIV RY oF CHATTELS IN THE POSSESSION
OF THIRD PAaRTE.-The defendant agreed to buy the plaintiff's business, including
the lease, good will and inventoried stock. One item in the bill of sale called for
two hundred and forty-five batteries, at $15 each. The plaintiff failed to deliver
one hundred and four of these batteries, which at the time for performance were
rented out and in the hands of the plaintiff's customers. The defendant refused
to perform. The plaintiff sued for $5,0oo, the amount agreed upon in the contract
as liquidated damages should the defendant fail to perform. Held, that the
plaintiff could not recover. Allen v. Baker (1923, Or.) 22o Pac. 574.
At common law and under section 43 (3) of the Uniform Sales Act, where
goods are it the time of the sale in the hands of a third person, the seller does
not fulfill his obligation to deliver until the third person acknowledges to the
buyer that he holds the goods on the buyer's behalf. Bentall v. Burl (1824,
I. B.) 3 Barn. & C. 423; Edwards, Hudnwn & Co. v. Meadows (18i) 71 Ala.
42; Bassett 2. Camp (1881) 54 Vt. 232; Williston, Sales (igo9) sec. 454.
"Goods" is defined as including all chattels personal other than choses in action.
Sales Act, sec. 76. But it can hardly be considered as including the good will of
a business, and the universal applicability of the above rule on delivery may be
doubted, where the thing sold by an indivisible contract is a going business, the
respective transfers of a lease, good will, book accounts, and inventory being only
parts of a whole. Recognition of a going business, as such, is repeatedly found in
the law. So wherever "going concern value," as distinct from the physical assets,
is used by courts as a basis for rate allowances to public service corporations.
Onuaha v. Omaha Water Co. (IgIo) 218 U. S. 18o, 30 Sup. Ct. 615; People v.
Willcox (1914) 21o N. Y. 479, 1O4 N. E. 911; contra: Houston v. S. W. Bell Tel.
Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 318, 42 Sup. Ct. 486; see COMMENTS (1922) 32 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 390; ibid. 507. Or where in preventing the appropriation of trade
values the courts are in substance giving legal protection to "going value."
American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co. (1899) 173 Mass. 85,
53 N. E. 141; Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co. (1914) 235 U. S. 88, 35 Sup. Ct.
91; Internationd News Se7vice v. The Associated Press (IgI8) 248 U. S. 215,
39 Sup. Ct. 68. Or again, in condemnation proceedings, compensation is usually
given on the basis of the enhanced market value, which is held to include "going
value." Kintg v. Minnwapolis Union Ry. (1884) 32 Minn. 224; Philbrook v.
Berlin-Shelburne Power Co. (1909) 75 N. H. 599, 74 Atl. 873; Voigt v. Milwau-
kee County (1914) 158 Wis. 666, 149 N. W. 392. Where a business is sold, the
going concern quality is often the major value transferred. In such a case rules
governing the sale of chattels as applied at least to such of the inventory as in use
in a way peculiar to the business, and not anticipated by the Sales Act, should be
subject to appropriate modification. This consideration might be applied to the
instant case, especially since chattels kept for renting purposes, when rented out and
earning profits, are better assets than those yet to be rented.
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TORTs-xjumaous FALsEHoo--No RECOVERY iN ABSENCE OF MAIGCE.-Posters
announcing the plaintiff's appearance at the defendants' theatre were not altered
after defendants learned that the statement was untrue. The plaintiff sued for
injurious falsehood, or alternatively, for libel, alleging as damages the loss of
an engagement. Held, that this was not libelous and that the plaintiff could
not recover for injurious falsehood as there was no "actual intent of injuring
the plaintiff." Shapiro v. LaMorta (1923, K. B.) 4o T. L. R. 39.
The modern tendency is to allow recovery for non-defamatory but malicious
falsehoods causing damage. Hollenbeck v. Ristine (1898) 105 Iowa, 488, 75
N. W. 355; American Insurance Co. v. France (1903) I1 Ill. App. 382; Rat-
cliffe v. Evans [1892, C. A.] 2 Q. B. 524. In some jurisdictions, however, it has
been held that the charge must also be defamatory. Knight v. Blackford (1884,
Sup. Ct. D. C.) 3 Mackey, 177; Legg v. Dunlevy (i88i) io Mo. App. 461. In
defamation an unauthorized use of defamatory words prima facie satisfies the
fictional prerequisite of malice in law. Allen v. Edward Light Co. (1921) 209
Mo. App. I65, 233 S. W. 953; Switzer v. Anthony (1922) 71 Colo. 291, 206 Pac.
391; Morrison v. Ritchie & Co. (19o2, Ct. of Sess.) 39 Scot. L. 432. But if the
statement is conditionally privileged the plaintiff must show that the defamatory
words were not spoken pursuant to the right and duty which created the privilege,
but from some other motive. Doane v. Grew (915) 220 Mass. 171, io7 N. E.
620. Similarly in disparagement of property the defendant's real or supposed
interest creates a privilege which is extinguished only upon proof of actual
malevolence. Swan v. Tappan (1849, Mass.) 5 Cush. 104; British Railway
Traffic & Electric Co. v. C. R. C. Co. [1922] 2 K. B. 26o. Here, too, if the
defendant has no interest to protect and the false words are mere impertinent
interference "malice" is said to be presumed. Nagy v. Manitoba Free Press
(19o7) 16 Manitoba, 619, affirmed 39 Can. Sup. Ct. 340; see Smith, Disparage-
nment of Property (1913) 13 Co. L. REv. 13. In requiring proof of ill-will or
intent to injure as an independent fact in injurious falsehoods the courts have
apparently arrived at the same result as in the cases of qualified privilege without
creating a prima facie cause of action from the mere fact of injury.
TRUSTS-REsULTNG TRUST FROM PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PmicE-DEscENT-
PURCHASERS FROM TusTF..--A husband purchased land with his wife's money,
and without her knowledge or consent, took title in his name. The husband died,
and the wife remarried. On the death of the wife, the children of the first
marriage claimed the land to the exclusion of a child born of the second marriage,
and brought suit against her to remove an alleged cloud on title. Held, that the
plaintiffs and defendant were seised in fee as tenants in common. Tyndall v.
Tyndall (1923) 186 N. C. 27i, 119 S. E. 354.
A resulting trust in favor of one paying the purchase price of land is not
executed by the Statute of Uses. Strimpfler v. Roberts (1852) i8 Pa. 283; 1
Tiffany, Real Property (1920) 398; contra: Hutchins v. Heywood (1871) 5o
N. H. 491. The cestui has an "equitable" defense to an action of ejectment by
the trustee. Hynds v. Hynds (1918) 274 MO. 123, 202 S. W. 387; see Cook,
Equitable Defenses (1923) 32 YA.E LAW JoURNAL., 645. He may get a "recon-
veyance" and so destroy the apparent title of the trustee. O'Donnell v. O'Donnell
(1922) 303 Ill. 31, 135 N. E. 28; Poll-man v. Curtice (1919, C. C. A. 8th) 255
Fed. 628 (same as to purchaser with notice). The trustee has only a power to pass
good title to a purchaser for value without notice. Talley v. Morley (1919) 149
Ga. 529, ioi S. E. io2o; see Goode v. R iley (1891) 153 Mass. 585, 28 N. E. 228;
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923) 155. But he is liable in
damages for such a conveyance in breach of the resulting trust. Davis v. Dicker-
son (1918) 137 Ark. 14, 2o7 S. W. 436; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th
ed. 1918) sec. Io58. These results as to the "rights" of the trustee and cestui
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are most frequently expressed in terms of "legal" and "equitable title." On
procedure cf. CommENTs (1923) 32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 707. The conclusion of
the principal case, that the heirs of the cestui are seised in fee, is a sound recogni-
tion that subject to the liability of conveyance by the trustee to a bona fide
purchaser, the only effective "title" was in the cestui. Such title descends without
regard to common law seisin. Shackleford v. Elliott (1904) 209 Ill. 333, 70 N. E.
745. The adjudication of the court destroys the power of the trustees to pass good
title, since it takes the place of a bill for reconveyance or a decree revesting title.
See 5 Pomeroy, op. cit. sec. 2165.
TRUSTS-VOLUNTARY DECLARATIoN OF TRUSTS OF PERSONALTY-EFFECT OF
NON-DELIVERY AND FAILURE To COMMUNICATE.-With intent to protect his father
in case he died before he was able to transfer his property in Germany, the
complainant in 1917 signed a document declaring that he held certain stock for the
benefit of his father, an alien enemy, and that for convenience the stock remained
in the name of the complainant who retained no interest except as trustee. The
complainant retained the stock and the document and did not communicate its
contents to anyone other than the attorney who advised it. The defendant, Alien
Property Custodian in I9ig, took the stock as alien enemy property. The com-
plainant sued as owner for the return of the stock. The lower court dismissed
the bill. Held, that the plaintiff recover since the document never became opera-
tive. Stoehr v. Miller (Dec. 17, 1923) U. S. C. C. A. 2d, Oct. Term, 1923,
No. I59.
Where a settlor constitutes another trustee of personal property for the benefit
of a third party, he must do sufficient acts to divest himself of all title and interest
in the res with the express intent to vest them in the trustee. Orton v. Tannen-
baum (i92o, 2d Dept.) 194 App. Div. 214, 185 N. Y. Supp. 68I; Lewin, Trusts
(i2th ed. 1911) 73. This may be done by a delivery of the res or of a deed of
conveyance or assignment. Talbot v. Talbot (911) 32 R. I. 72, 78 At. 535; Ann.
Cas. 1912 C, 1235, note. In the case of a family settlement, however, the courts
require only slight evidence of a delivery. Tarbox v. Grant (1898) 56 N. J. Eq.
I99, 39 Atl. 378 (deed executed in presence of beneficiaries) ; Fletcher v. Fletcher
(1844, Ch.) 4 Hare, 67 (recital in deed of agreement with trustees) ; see Clavering
v. Clavering (704, Ch.) 2 Vern. 473. Where the settlor constitutes himself
trustee, any declaration of an intent to hold in trust in praesenti is sufficient.
Korompilos v. Tompras (1923, Mo.) 251 S. W. 8o (parol) ; Rollestone v. National
Bank of Coininerce (1923, Mo.) 252 S. W. 394 (writing); 12 L. R. A. (N. S.)
547, note. And extrinsic circumstances are admissible to determine the intent
where the declaration is equivocal. Anibrosius v. Ambrosius (1917, C. C. A. 2d)
239 Fed. 473; Allen v. Hendrick (1922) 104 Or. 20C2, 2o6 Pac. 733. A delivery
of the trust res or of a deed of assignment is not necessary. Janes v. Falk (x892)
5o N. J. Eq. 468, 26 Atl. 138; O'Neil v. Greenwood (I895) io6 Mich. 572, 64
N. W. 511; Knagenhieln v. R. I. Hospital Co. (92) 43 R I. 559, 114 At. 5;
contra: 'Govin v. De Miranda (1894, N. Y.) 76 Hun, 414. It has even been held
that where such a declaration of trust is in writing there need not be a communica-
tion to any person of the declaration of trust. In re Smitlr's Estate (1891) 144
Pa. 428, 22 Atl. 916; In re Eshbach's Estate (19oo) 197 Pa. 153, 46 AtI. 905; see
In re Cozens [1913] 2 Ch. 478, 486; cf. Landon v. Hutton (1892) 50 N. J. Eq.
500, 25 Ad. 953. Such a view is open to the danger that the declaration may have
been prepared without a present trust intent. The court in the instant case, how-
ever, seems to approve this view, but the facts of the case did not require a deci-
sion of this point. The result reached by the court is sound since in accordance
with the intent of the settlor, the trust was never perfected.
